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Post by Beth on Aug 13, 2015 0:29:15 GMT
A few days ago Justin laid out some very interesting and thought provoking point on his perspective of LBH. Each point is well worth an entire thread of it's own for discussion.
(1) The 7th cavalry in 1876 was a poor quality regiment, dominated by a non-combat disinterested Lt Col frequently on extensively leaves of absence. Neither Col Smith or Col Sturgis appear to have had much of an impact on their regiment. The only other officer who appears to have had any imprint on the regiment was Maj Gibbs, and he was dead before the 1870s. It was invariably dispersed on constabulary duty, usually reconstruction, and training was haphazard and dependent upon company level.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 13, 2015 12:27:12 GMT
The 7th was not the only Regiment dispersed for reconstruction duty and separated to different frontier posts. The pool from which the manpower was drawn was the same for all regiments. I don't think GAC was disinterested in combat, only the mundane day to day duties and life on a frontier post. That may be why Sturgis, Smith, and numerous other officers applied for detached duty. I also think the Fetterman attitude rose all the way to Chicago. I play fantasy football, it is not always about the stars of the game, it is often about the weekly matchups. The matchup on 6/25/76 was a bad one and the other team had a few stars as well. When you play an away game you need to take the fans out of the equation.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Beth on Aug 13, 2015 21:54:55 GMT
I guess one of the questions that has to be asks is, is Custer's handling of the 7th (or the 7th in general) different from other regiments. Is it the system that is broke or the 7th that is broke?
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Post by quincannon on Aug 14, 2015 0:46:56 GMT
Both were broken Beth.
Each of both the cavalry and Infantry regiments were organized in an identical manner, the cavalry with twelve companies, the Infantry with ten. Each drew on the same material to fill their ranks. Each was equipped to the same standard.
Just looking at the Cavalry regiments: Each had a 12 to 1 span of control, in a day when a four to one placed too great a burden on a commander. The three majors were not necessarily in the chain of command unless placed there by the regimental commander. Most of the time they were not there anyway. What this means is that if the company commanders were not training their troops, no one was. Add the scattering of each of the regiments many times into multiple departments and you have created a cocktail of un-readiness for battle.
So we can see that structurally these units were broken. A 12 to 1 is too great a span of control today, much less then. The difference is though that nearly everyone of those other nine regimental commanders figured out how to compensate, and the 7th never did during the totality of the Indian campaigns. They were bad each and every time they took the field, up to and including Wounded Knee, so there was something within that regiment that made it a foul ball, and it was not just Custer.
Putting it in plain terms so all may understand, the 7th Cavalry Regiment was not worth a bucket of spit, until the Philippines in 1944, and again not worth that same bucket of spit until Billy Harris took them in Korea.
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Post by royalwelsh on Aug 14, 2015 1:10:29 GMT
I guess one of the questions that has to be asks is, is Custer's handling of the 7th (or the 7th in general) different from other regiments. Is it the system that is broke or the 7th that is broke? Beth, Both, but other regiments better compensated. "The GAC Show" just exacerbated problems within the 7th. It was a well-connected regiment. Sheridan as ADC to his brother. Merrill as CMS to Pres Grant. Tourtellote as ADC to Sherman. Ilsley as ADC to Pope. But it needed those officers in the field in June 1876. Not 1st and 2nd lieutenants beholden to GAC commanding companies on the eastern bluffs.... RW
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Aug 14, 2015 1:47:04 GMT
QC/RW Was Benteen a problem that Custer could not handle? He seems to be invisible except for his conduct at the LBH and the prickly relationship he had with GAC. I see him as the glue that held the 7th together from June 25 to the 27th when Terry and his force arrived. Would another commander have used Benteen differently or had a better relationship with him? I realize this is drifting into the fantasy world but am endeavoring to see if the quality of the 7th could have been better using assets as Benteen instead of sending him away. After all he was the best combat commander available, right? Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Aug 14, 2015 2:37:20 GMT
I won't comment Dave except to say:
When your unit is in such a state of affairs that when the commander speaks, those that are spoken to, casually gaze at another officer, one more junior, expecting him to give a slight affirmative nod to say OK, that unit is in a heap of trouble up to its eyeballs. I think that post 1700 hours on 25 June that junior officer that the others expected the affirmative nod from was Benteen.
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Post by royalwelsh on Aug 14, 2015 12:23:48 GMT
QC/RW Was Benteen a problem that Custer could not handle? He seems to be invisible except for his conduct at the LBH and the prickly relationship he had with GAC. I see him as the glue that held the 7th together from June 25 to the 27th when Terry and his force arrived. Would another commander have used Benteen differently or had a better relationship with him? I realize this is drifting into the fantasy world but am endeavoring to see if the quality of the 7th could have been better using assets as Benteen instead of sending him away. After all he was the best combat commander available, right? Regards Dave Dave, The GAC/Benteen relationship is a very complex one. You notice that Benteen wasn't sent on detached service, despite the divisional commander being GAC's mentor - what does that tell you? RW
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 14, 2015 12:31:40 GMT
When I see old photos from that era the soldiers do look dishevelled, I suppose looking after a couple of hundred soldiers on an isolated camp based in the middle of nowhere can have that effect, but I wonder if the comparison could be made for say a British Cavalry squadron or regiment based in the Sudan or Indian around the same period, would they keep their uniforms and weapons in tip top condition? Would they be kept under ridged rules and trained to a high standard?
I know it may take some searching, but I could have been a little hard on the US military from this period, because in the past I have criticized them, but maybe the British army was the same and when I get some time I may try to find a comparison between the two.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 14, 2015 14:49:58 GMT
On campaign a soldiers uniform is of secondary importance. There are none so scruffy looking in the field as U S Special Forces.
Look to the condition of their weapons, ammunition, and the general state of repair of their load bearing equipment. Insure they have dry well mended socks. Look at the condition of the feet and boots. Check them for rashes, bites, and abrasions, and if they have them insure that the soldier is tending to them. Make sure they are hydrating themselves.
These are the things that count. This is how you measure discipline.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Aug 14, 2015 15:59:09 GMT
On campaign a soldiers uniform is of secondary importance. There are none so scruffy looking in the field as U S Special Forces.
Look to the condition of their weapons, ammunition, and the general state of repair of their load bearing equipment. Insure they have dry well mended socks. Look at the condition of the feet and boots. Check them for rashes, bites, and abrasions, and if they have them insure that the soldier is tending to them. Make sure they are hydrating themselves.
These are the things that count. This is how you measure discipline. QC What I have discerned from my limited studying and reading of this battle, is that the material condition of the 7th was not very good. 1) The lack of horses at the Powder River resupply camp 2) Little or no firearms training 3) Forced march caused excessive fatigue for soldiers and mounts 4) Little time allowed for the recently consolidated regiment for training and coordination practice allowing the officers to learn the campaign goals 5) Hydration does not seemed to have been important to GAC and regiment suffers for it If I am wrong please correct me as I have been called several names by moderator on another board for faulting Custer. I am comfortable in my position but would appreciate hearing your thoughts and increase my knowledge. I attempt to follow Montrose's advice to eschew emotions and just study the facts. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Aug 14, 2015 16:39:23 GMT
Dave:
1) Proven fact, no discussion required.
2) Proven fact, no discussion required.
3) Forced marches and excessive fatigue are to be expected. Training can help somewhat, especially physical conditioning of the soldier himself. For the horseflesh I will leave that to AZ to answer, but suffice to say you can not pull into the Exxon, feed them with premium grade oats and then continue down the highway. Horse cavalry depends on the condition of the mount, and monitoring that condition is a command responsibility at all levels.
4) You can have the best trained individual soldiers in all Christendom, but if they are not trained as a team, then a team of teams, they are worthless in battle.
5) Lack of adequate hydration for both soldier and mount is a self inflicted wound.
If you called out Custer for any one of these five above, you are on firm ground. Don't think I would worry about it were I you.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Aug 14, 2015 16:47:04 GMT
QC AS Beth sez "always a student." I appreciate your response since this was one of my correct---OK the only time---posts. I am slowly learning more of the military aspect of this battle. Thinking like a soldier is impossible unless you have been one. Regrards Dave
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 14, 2015 18:28:59 GMT
Now I have got my “civilian acting like a soldier” cap on at the moment so please forgive me, but wouldn’t it be practical to deploy units that could at least hold their own before you split them into small battalions/companies? I think that the cavalry placed too much emphasis on the fact that they were cavalry and no Indians would dare to take them on, then to try and beat them in a fire fight.
This is what I think, that any force not able to defend a 360° area is going to be first surrounded and second attacked from the rear.
Also if you place these small companies in a situation to achieve local fire superiority then make sure that they can shoot, if any unit is placed in this situation then give orders for them to pull out as soon as the enemy regains the initiative or appears to be out flanking them.
We have discussed this before that these companies were not infantry, and therefore at a disadvantage when fighting a pitched battle, so why were they committed to fight in this role.
Again this could have been down to officers being overcome by events that made them lose control pretty quickly, this could have happened to Reno and Keogh. Keogh could be thinking he was controlling things then before he knows it his flank is turned and his front disintegrates, all this could have happened in minutes. At the end of the day none of these companies could not hold any ground for any great length of time.
Yan.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 14, 2015 19:07:07 GMT
Yan, Certainly not divided up, as you mention earlier in your post. The 7th may have been dysfunctional, in the waysthat we have all questioned. There were quite a number of quality officers here Benteen, MacDougal, French, Yates, and some quality junior officers that later went on to become General officers. Some of these parts may have been better than the whole. That being said, if all of these officers were together, in a concentrated attack the results would have been different. Custer would probably be alive as well as many more EM's. The Centennial Campaign may have even ended in the centennial year. As Will and Chuck will tell you planning and tactics will out.
Regards, Tom
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