Never Got to Ford D

[miker]

OK, here is the table for Nelson's ride from the Reno BP to Calhoun Hill.

WHO	START	END	DEPART	DISTANCE	TIME	ARRIVE
NELSON	RENO BP	CALHOUN HILL	1420	19685	60 (WALK)	1520
NELCON	RENO BP	CALHOUN HILL	1420	19685	22 (GALLOP)	1440

I select 1410 as the departure time because that is the time Weir left on his march.  I have him somewhat following the current battlefield tour road, then diverting North to Calhoun Hill "cross country" when he sees the Custer Battalion gathered there.  I am gratified my route, at the walk, is only 2 minutes different from Nelson's ridge, which of course doesn't mean anything.

This is based on Godfrey hearing the gun fire at 1410 (From Wagner) and Benteen and Reno taking 10 minutes to figure out a response, and Benteen to move out.    The main decision here is not to wait for the packtrain.   This presumes also presumes an unopposed advance, which I believe about as likely as my winning the Florida lottery (which I don't enter).

Reno prepares a defensive position, waits for the Packs, then assigns men from the pack train to report to their companies and deploy for defense.  I would use the remaining people whose companies are not present, as the reserve.  This would be to protect the trains.

Something effective done at once can be better than the right thing hours later.

If they walked the whole route, they would have to fight to try and link up.  If they galloped, then they, again without opposition, could have joined  with the Custer BN bringing the strength to 8 companies.

They could leave as late as 1500 - 1515 if they waited for the Pack Train to close.  Then I would posit Benteen taking four companies with him leaving Reno's Battalion to attend the wounded and guard the pack train.

Miles says that had Reno/Benteen moved with all 7 companies, they could have been effective.  I doubt this.  Reno's BN is probably fought out, horses are beat, and probably need ammunition.  Still if they waited until 1500, Then all the details sheparding company packs could have returned and Benteen could have moved with 4 companies, leaving the perhaps fought out Reno BN guarding the wounded and packs.

Next, I'm going to reexamine the results of "A Good Walk Around the Boundary" to try and determine if there was skirmishing going on as evidenced by US Army Cartridge at or near the turn around point.  I will also post some maps.

[quincannon]

I believe everyone here knows what I think of Fred Wagner's internal timing of events which is to say not much. That is where I think he was determined to make his mark, internal timing, and as such to out Grey, Grey. He failed because of that hubris I feel, because if he got one event incorrect, or in an incorrect sequence his internal timing swirls around the bottom of the toilet bowl. That said, and I guess that's a lot, I believe his gross timing as to the beginning and the end of the Custer battle is pretty much correct. So much so that I fully accept them.

Regardless of what Reno or Benteen sent forward, or when it was sent forward following the 1410 hours Godfrey cites it would have been too late to do anything except get themselves cut off and cut up. The battle was over up north when Weir arrived, and he arrived before any of them. There are indications that the Indians that fought Custer knew that Reno/Benteen were coming up. That knowledge was most likely provided by the low dust cloud the regiment (-) would have made as they proceeded along the bluff route. The regiment was quite fortunate to have some leaders that recognized they were in a bad spot at Weir Point, and that a successful defensive action was more than problematic, bordering on the insane. The only reason they were able to withdraw back to the R/B defense site and dig in was the narrowness of the bluff trail, and the restricted access to that trail from east and west. Were it not for an accident of nature, it would have been Richard the Thirds nail, shoe, horse all over again.

[miker]

I’m not saying Fred’s times are right, grey’s times are right, and certainly my times are not right. What important here are the speeds and the overal times.

What I am trying to illustrate is the possibility of units being able to link up. My view is not likely.

[quincannon]

Mike: I was only pointing out that I think Wagner had it right as to start and finish times. Beyond that no one's times are right, and cannot be because we have no knowledge of the entirety of the internal events, or their exact sequence, nor can we. It is the height of hubris to think that we can, and Fred tripped himself up on his own hubris, the passionate desire to make something finite which cannot be made so.

As far as I can determine your movement times over specific ground is indicative of your training, and I find no fault with that. But then again, while believing yours are properly calculated, you do not have any knowledge of which ground was actually traversed, as opposed to the ground you may think might have been traversed.

No one can know, that which cannot be known.

My view on link up is not likely as well. The enemy has a vote on such matters.

[miker]

I failed to discern what you meant. I do not believe my times or routes were correct, but they might be plausible.

I think the “short” move toward Ford D is more plausible than the “long” one.

I find it implausible that Custer’s movement was unopposed and he was hounded every foot of the way.

If he did not establish a rear guard, he was foolish.

I have no idea what he was trying to do. He was the target of a Sioux/Cheyenne Cannae.

[quincannon]

Plausible is what I meant. You used your training to figure them out. I trust your training. Got the same stuff in my day. It's good figuring.

I find not being hounded, in at least some measure just as implausible as you, and that's why I do not think he split off anyone for any reason.

Rear guard. You bet your sweet ass that anyone who does not have a rear guard even if they are going to the latrine are not foolish. THEY ARE INSANE

Sitting Bull learned all about Cannae when he was a cadet at West Point. Didn't you know that. Some silly bastard posited that on another board many years ago. He lived in his Mama's basement, in Queens I think.

[miker]

Aug 17, 2023 23:59:44 GMT quincannon said:

Sitting Bull learned all about Cannae when he was a cadet at West Point. Didn't you know that. Some silly bastard posited that on another board many years ago. He lived in his Mama's basement, in Queens I think.

That's a good one.  Of course, Hannibal didn't know how it would come out, but he might have been first.  It was a high payoff low probability event.  On the other hand, Dan Morgan knew what he was going to do and understood Tarleton.

[quincannon]

Understanding the guy you face, either personally or at least understanding how they were wedded to method, is about 50 percent of winning any battle be you Barca or Captain Joe Shit the Ragman. It's the guy who can think out of the box that better concern the crap out of you.

Been reading recently about the Valley Campaign of 64. Two things struck me. Sheridan was inside Early's mind, and he used cavalry the way we today would use armor.

[mac]

Enjoying your work Mike.

Just quickly; I have to go but will return tomorrow.

We know Custer was not opposed early on while Martini was with him.

We know from archaeology, and accounts, that he was harassed (probably slowed) by Wolf Tooth and others on Luce/Nye Cartwright.

Wolf Tooth says the Indians peeled off and only returned as Custer was descending (deploying) off the ridge (LSH/Cemetery) into the valley.

So unopposed for quite a portion of the trip.

Wolf Tooth also says that Company E (grey horses) were the rear guard as Custer moved North.

Cheers

[quincannon]

Point by point Mac

1) We don't know that Custer was unopposed when Martini was with him. That is probably true, but we do not know it. The fact Martini never mentioned opposition is what we know, but he does say the Indians were running (I don't use the word he used because I do not want to reduce myself to illiteracy, for its own sake). We know his horse was wounded and I personally believe he wounded the horse himself by accident (not intention) but there is a small chance the horse was grazed by enemy fire. We can't know what we cannot know.

2) That we know.

3&4) Yes, we know what Wolf Tooth said, but peeling off and presumably keeping fairly close does not equate to being unopposed. They were opposed by maneuver if not fire, and maneuver leads to fire if one is not aware that they are still out there and could appear at any second in range and shooting at you. Being unopposed means out of contact, and no contact had been broken according to my reading of the Wolf Tooth account. Being a couple of hundred yards apart and not shooting at each other is a long way from out of contact and unopposed.

5) Those damned grey horses seem to be everywhere in this tale. In this instance though I believe that is exactly where they were, a rear guard, and probably the last to get into an assault position nearest the river. Seems to make the most sense having the lead company travel the furthest, and the trail company the shortest distance. That's how I would do it anyway if I was traveling generally north in column, and I intended to assault westward in battalion line companies in line.

[miker]

Aug 18, 2023 2:34:32 GMT mac said:

We know Custer was not opposed early on while Martini was with him.

thanks Mac. 

My analysis starts at 1430. Martini was dispatched at about 1300.   I grant Custer is unopposed for quite a while as he moves toward the NW, but from about 1400 on Custer is probably under continuous observation if not fire for the rest of the battle. 

But again from marker placement, we can infer there were few, if any,  killed until Custer was back on battle ridge.  Marksmanship on all sides seems to be somewhat lacking. 

I strongly suggest you read A Good Walk.  It is somewhat eye opening.  Perhaps something similar will come from the Donohue presentation to provide information about the Ford D episode. 

[herosrest]

I updating on the current topic posts in wondering if a revelation has arrived. I have an obscure unrelated thought and silly one which I'll post elsewhere in hope.

I hold the view that troops dis get onto the Ford Dvterrain and it is shown in, and told of bynative accounts and drawings. But, it was battle's close in escape and evade. I see that Boundary and Nelson are considered and this is good. Donahue picked up that ball and no-one is going to strip it away.

Pinned down surrounded under attrition those who could, broke out. Gibbon the origination of Donahue's interest did not find evidence of organised military presence on that terrain or riding up from the river Ford D area He was looking. He found Kellogg. That Donahue's interpretation of Kellogg's find site is not proof of Einstein's theory. It is not the 1 in a hundrrd he got right.

Read Gibbon:s account and tell me hand on heart that you can figure out where Kellogg lay.

Regards all.

[herosrest]

Aug 18, 2023 1:04:43 GMT miker said:

Aug 17, 2023 23:59:44 GMT quincannon said:

Sitting Bull learned all about Cannae when he was a cadet at West Point. Didn't you know that. Some silly bastard posited that on another board many years ago. He lived in his Mama's basement, in Queens I think.

That's a good one.  Of course, Hannibal didn't know how it would come out, but he might have been first.  It was a high payoff low probability event.  On the other hand, Dan Morgan knew what he was going to do and understood Tarleton.

This story did do the rounds and a letter from Garlington, to Stanley Vestal (aka Walter Campbell) is on file in his collection at OU online. The scout hiding inside a dead horse is also mentioned. If any ones interested, i'll dig it out from their files. There were some remakably silly tall tales which got published in the press - tongue in cheek and of course, anyone who didn't fish was likely to at least bite, rather than smile.

When the valley attack folde and reached Reno Hill, Reno's decision and you can argue for or against, he had a duty to open communication with Custer, Cooke, Keogh and Yates. They died because they lost their horses. All Reno had to do was order a guidon party forward and communicate - 'Standing here. Et al'.

Five companies downriver - reverse out of impending disaster.

[herosrest]

That was a major pain............ sheesh. Good for the memory I guess. Here's E.A. Garlington on Sitting Bull. It's at page 18 - link 


Very truly yours,

E. A. GARLINGTON ,
Brig. Gen, U.S.A., Ret'd.
Chief of the Historical Divisions of the General Staff,
War Department,
Washington D.C.

[quincannon]

Mike: Don't think Martini left that early, but maybe.

HR: Cross my heart - Benteen and his orderly found Kellogg just where the old marker was next to the old entrance road. Benteen says so, and his orderly verifies it and goes on to say that they found Trooper Tweed not all that far away "up the ridge". Benteen's orderly remembers Tweed whom he met at Jefferson Barracks. Tweed was from Company L. Never read Gibbon, at least I don't remember it. Try again sweetheart.

Open communications with Custer. No question that was Reno's duty, but each commander must translate one's duty into the means to perform that duty. Reno did not have the means to go to Custer, and would not have for about an hour or so. He did have the means though to send scouts out to attempt to find him and he failed in that duty. What those scouts had they been sent most likely would have found, even if they had been sent out immediately after first link up with Benteen (trains still in the rear but coming) was Custer's battalion in the last stages of their fight.