Post by miker on Jan 21, 2023 16:38:44 GMT
Many people seem to believe the 7th never went to Ford B or at least question it. The evidence seems convincing they did. Let us review the bidding and some evidence.
We know Custer led his battalion after leaving Reno without the promised support by veering to the North without informing him, up toward what would become the Reno-Benteen Battle Position, then proceeded down Cedar Coulee to Medicine Tail Coulee with five companies.
Custer knew about Ford B from his Crow Indian Scouts, including Mitch Boyer who apparently had direct knowledge of the area, although I suspect no one in the 7th Cavalry knew where it was since there were no detailed maps of the region.
If one looks at the Bonfade Map (Little Bighorn Battlefield Map: Archaeological Finds and Historical Locations), one can easily determine the 7th Cavalry (-) under Custer (-) was operating in two wings: one in the North along Nye-Cartwright (facing North, East and Southeast and one in the South (facing South and East) as outlined in blue
To gain a sense of scale, I measured the closed 3300 closed contour line on a 1:10,000 scale map of the area and found it to be 350 yards long.
The North skirmish line is about 700 yards long and the South skirmish line is about 500 yards long.
Troopers in a mounted or dismounted skirmish line would normally deploy, whether mounted or dismounted) at 5 yard intervals or greater or smaller distance as determined by the commander. A ‘normal’ deployment would have 3 or 4 men in a line about 10 to 15 yards with a gap of 15 yards between fours.
We can then determine the Northern skirmish line required three companies and the Southern Line two.
My study convinces me the battalion was sequenced I, C, L, E, F. Thus I assign I, C, and L to the North line and E and F to the South line.
Notice there are smaller regions, marked by rectangles, showing detached parties that could represent command groups, parties dispatched to clear a specific region, scouts, or a patrol. Clearly the small group in the center South has advanced toward the ford. (They could be Indians with Army Carbines shooting at the skirmish line.)
There are hundreds of cartridges on Nye-Cartwright and Luce Ridges, indicating this could be the source of the volleys heard on the Reno-Benteen Position. They probably would not have fired these volleys just as signal, so we should assume they are 7th is seriously engaged by Indians – at least by Wolf Tooth’s band, with perhaps more coming from the Reno fight or across the ford at Medicine Tail Coulee.
The Bonifade map does not show spent Army cartridges (at least I cannot discern them with a magnifying glass or through image enhancement) near Ford B, but Jerome Greene’s book (Evidence and the Custer Enigma: A Reconstruction of Indian-Military History) provides a map showing cavalry bullets/casings in the regions highlighted by rectangles below.
Lastly, Strategy of Defeat, Map C, page 304-305 identifies four bodies being identified as present at the site as stated in shows four named markers in the Ford B Area. No officers were found at Ford B. EDIT: I mistakenly thought all four were from E or F Company. Only William Brown was from F, Trumpeter Dose was from G Company. CPL Foley (From C CO) and 1SG Butler (From L CO) do not contribute to the theory. This is what happens when you fail to your facts and rely on memory. While this diminishes support for my premise, one is enough to lend it some credence. Not definitive, however. Thanks to Chuck and Mac for the corrections.
I suspect A Good Walk Around the Boundary: Archaeological Inventory of the Dyck and Other Properties Adjacent to the Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument (referenced by Wagner in Strategy of Defeat) would provide additional evidence for actions around the Ford one way or the other. Alas, it is not available for purchase or download and my queries to various institutions have not been fruitful. This book could change my conclusions. There are places which cite the reference, a couple places which purport the user to be able to download a free pdf, but I am wary of them, but otherwise I have been unable to obtain or read this book.
Regardless of what anyone thinks, this is evidence some part of the 7th Cavalry went to or near Ford B, scouted the ford, suffered killed and wounded, and returned to the main body in the south.
I also cannot believe Custer would just sit in the North while he has people scouting Ford B. If he did not go himself, I think he would surely be with Yates and companies E and F. Upon observing the actions and hearing the report of the scouting party, I think Custer would have realized he would not be able to capture the non-combatants fleeing north and he is being pressured from the North, East, and South. The first order of business is to unite the five companies into a single battalion. It appears likely Calhoun Hill is a logical place to assemble after moving through Cedar and Medicine Tail Coulees.
The next post shall discuss this movement to Calhoun Hill and the subsequent action. I will post a link here when it is ready.
P.S. Please do not contaminate this thread with extraneous subject matter. Thanks.
We know Custer led his battalion after leaving Reno without the promised support by veering to the North without informing him, up toward what would become the Reno-Benteen Battle Position, then proceeded down Cedar Coulee to Medicine Tail Coulee with five companies.
Custer knew about Ford B from his Crow Indian Scouts, including Mitch Boyer who apparently had direct knowledge of the area, although I suspect no one in the 7th Cavalry knew where it was since there were no detailed maps of the region.
If one looks at the Bonfade Map (Little Bighorn Battlefield Map: Archaeological Finds and Historical Locations), one can easily determine the 7th Cavalry (-) under Custer (-) was operating in two wings: one in the North along Nye-Cartwright (facing North, East and Southeast and one in the South (facing South and East) as outlined in blue
To gain a sense of scale, I measured the closed 3300 closed contour line on a 1:10,000 scale map of the area and found it to be 350 yards long.
The North skirmish line is about 700 yards long and the South skirmish line is about 500 yards long.
Troopers in a mounted or dismounted skirmish line would normally deploy, whether mounted or dismounted) at 5 yard intervals or greater or smaller distance as determined by the commander. A ‘normal’ deployment would have 3 or 4 men in a line about 10 to 15 yards with a gap of 15 yards between fours.
- Companies average a strength of about 40 men for the expedition. If we assume each company
- Remains mounted at this point,
- Detailed 7 men for the trains, reduces strength to 33 men, and
- a further 5 men (CO, 1 lieutenant and 1 sergeant OR 2 sergeants, a guidon bearer, and trumpeter) reduce the company to a 28-person firing line, resulting in
- 7 fours occupying a firing line of 195 yards
We can then determine the Northern skirmish line required three companies and the Southern Line two.
My study convinces me the battalion was sequenced I, C, L, E, F. Thus I assign I, C, and L to the North line and E and F to the South line.
Notice there are smaller regions, marked by rectangles, showing detached parties that could represent command groups, parties dispatched to clear a specific region, scouts, or a patrol. Clearly the small group in the center South has advanced toward the ford. (They could be Indians with Army Carbines shooting at the skirmish line.)
There are hundreds of cartridges on Nye-Cartwright and Luce Ridges, indicating this could be the source of the volleys heard on the Reno-Benteen Position. They probably would not have fired these volleys just as signal, so we should assume they are 7th is seriously engaged by Indians – at least by Wolf Tooth’s band, with perhaps more coming from the Reno fight or across the ford at Medicine Tail Coulee.
The Bonifade map does not show spent Army cartridges (at least I cannot discern them with a magnifying glass or through image enhancement) near Ford B, but Jerome Greene’s book (Evidence and the Custer Enigma: A Reconstruction of Indian-Military History) provides a map showing cavalry bullets/casings in the regions highlighted by rectangles below.
Lastly, Strategy of Defeat, Map C, page 304-305 identifies four bodies being identified as present at the site as stated in shows four named markers in the Ford B Area. No officers were found at Ford B. EDIT: I mistakenly thought all four were from E or F Company. Only William Brown was from F, Trumpeter Dose was from G Company. CPL Foley (From C CO) and 1SG Butler (From L CO) do not contribute to the theory. This is what happens when you fail to your facts and rely on memory. While this diminishes support for my premise, one is enough to lend it some credence. Not definitive, however. Thanks to Chuck and Mac for the corrections.
I suspect A Good Walk Around the Boundary: Archaeological Inventory of the Dyck and Other Properties Adjacent to the Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument (referenced by Wagner in Strategy of Defeat) would provide additional evidence for actions around the Ford one way or the other. Alas, it is not available for purchase or download and my queries to various institutions have not been fruitful. This book could change my conclusions. There are places which cite the reference, a couple places which purport the user to be able to download a free pdf, but I am wary of them, but otherwise I have been unable to obtain or read this book.
Regardless of what anyone thinks, this is evidence some part of the 7th Cavalry went to or near Ford B, scouted the ford, suffered killed and wounded, and returned to the main body in the south.
I also cannot believe Custer would just sit in the North while he has people scouting Ford B. If he did not go himself, I think he would surely be with Yates and companies E and F. Upon observing the actions and hearing the report of the scouting party, I think Custer would have realized he would not be able to capture the non-combatants fleeing north and he is being pressured from the North, East, and South. The first order of business is to unite the five companies into a single battalion. It appears likely Calhoun Hill is a logical place to assemble after moving through Cedar and Medicine Tail Coulees.
The next post shall discuss this movement to Calhoun Hill and the subsequent action. I will post a link here when it is ready.
P.S. Please do not contaminate this thread with extraneous subject matter. Thanks.
