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Post by Beth on Aug 8, 2015 15:35:11 GMT
It strikes me that the Battle of the Rosebud was is a primer for what the NA actions were at LBH.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 8, 2015 16:23:11 GMT
It strikes me that the Battle of the Rosebud was is a primer for what the NA actions were at LBH. If this is so, could not the NA's actions of running from Reno in the valley, been learned at the Fetterman battle 12 years earlier. Remember some NA's said they expected to be attacked. Could the warriors up Reno Creek have acted as an early warning system.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Aug 8, 2015 17:39:28 GMT
Early warning indicates some measure of command if not command and control. Who was running that guard roster?
If they expected to be attacked, and I find no fault with that statement, they would not know the place or the hour. I have always taken that statement as more general in nature, as in the village was attacked on the Powder River so attacking a village again is more than a remote possibility. Crook would have reinforced that notion by his presence in the general area. The presence of say a platoon's worth of Indians that confronted Reno was more likely there by happenstance. Had it been an organized security measure, the main body that confronted Reno just short of the village would have been in a much higher state of alert than they were. There is no other indication of any local security, or if their is I am not aware of it.
The Fetterman incident was for want of a better term a preplanned opportunity. Fort Phil Kearny was under observation and in fact constricted by a loose siege ring during virtually all of its existence, not unlike the pre-assault phase of Dien Bien Phu. Phil Kearny was also situated in a similar manner as Dien Bien Phu, in a bowl surrounded by high ground. With Fetterman, Indians baited, and Fetterman fell for the bait. It was simply an invitation to a dance that Fetterman should have known to refuse.
If Rosebud proved anything it was that these people could and would engage in a stand up fight when they held at least some manner of advantage. I don't believe that either Fetterman or the Rosebud showed anything new about Indian tactical concepts that were not already known. They hit when it was to their advantage, the trap and ambush was a favored technique, and man for man they were just as good at soldering as any on earth.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 8, 2015 19:04:24 GMT
Chuck, I totally agree, but let's suppose that all were warned that if they were chased, molested, or attacked were told to head back to camp, making as big a ruckus as the could and they would be supported by the whole command (lol). They knew that the army was in the area, they were also told of Sitting Bulls predictions of soldiers falling into camp. They pretty much knew the size of the Montana Column and were not awed. Think about it if you were out hunting with Chris's hunting arrows and accosted by a larger aggressive force would not want to return to a location where you can turn the tables. Would you not raise a ruckus so those you were returning to could prepare a reception party.
So no, not Fetterman like, but the NA's were prepared non the less. On the other hand both Fetterman and Custer felt that they and their command could handle whatever they came up against. Neither had a clue as to what they were up against, both were ambushed/trapped by their arrogance and lack of preparedness.
Sorry for the rather smart reply to Beth's post. I will stand by the fact that the NA's, in both cases, knew where to drag their pursuers.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Aug 8, 2015 20:02:18 GMT
And I totally agree --- It was the same thing we would tell our children when they were young --- If you are chased, molested, or attacked run for home screaming at the top of your lungs.
And you hit the daily double in agreement here as well. Both Fetterman and Custer belonged in Pee Wee football as far as fighting Indians went, and if for no other reason a consistent tendency for underestimation of abilities, while the Indians were at least in the CAB squad of the NFL.
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mac
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Post by mac on Aug 9, 2015 22:16:47 GMT
The Rosebud shows what more experienced people would realise, that when they had numerical superiority and thought they could succeed the NA were very aggressive. Custer clearly did not consider this in the tactics he used at LBH. Crazy Horse is an interesting guy and was present at the Fetterman fight and some say he planned it. The command and control question is interesting too. Clearly the Nez Perce were learning from experience and probably so too the other tribes. Just not fast enough and from a poor logistical base for supporting such training. Cheers
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Post by Beth on Aug 10, 2015 2:20:13 GMT
What struck me while reading about the Rosebud, is how many of the same things happened at LBH, like targeting the cavalry horses being held by the fours and attacking smaller groups instead of the whole. The main difference between the two battles is that Crook remained in a place he could see and react to the battle. Custer on the other hand had no idea what was going on with the rest of his regiment because he didn't have line of sight with anyone.
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mac
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Post by mac on Aug 10, 2015 12:23:01 GMT
Good observations Beth! I have heard people claim that the warriors just swarmed in battle and it is just not true. They did not have the kind of command and control a regular army would show but they were smart and had a suite of tactics that they knew and used and as we have seen they did learn. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Aug 10, 2015 16:14:18 GMT
I think the real lesson from Rosebud should be that the Indians were perfectly willing to adopt the operational offensive during this stage of the campaign. That attack in today's terms would be called a spoiling attack, one designed to upset the adversaries plans.
If any "defeat" could be attached to the Rosebud it was and operational loss on the Crook side. Had only Crook's column been in the field, that spoiling attack may have bought weeks of precious time.
Other than Rosebud the Indians were on the operational defensive throughout the campaign.
I also agree that there was some manner of sophistication in this operationally. Tactically for the Indians it was same old, same old.
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dave
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Post by dave on Aug 10, 2015 17:55:21 GMT
I am sure this a poor analogy but to me the Indians swallowed GAC and the 7th like fire ants do a frog. Completely overwhelmed, unceasing attacks and then death. It helps me to better visualize the Indians actions. Regards Dave
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 10, 2015 18:11:33 GMT
Holly crotch crickets, Batman, are you an entomologist?
Regards, Tom
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mac
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Post by mac on Aug 10, 2015 22:23:35 GMT
Dave I see what you are saying but would point out that their attacks were not just swarms. In the valley Reno was flanked and enveloped. At Calhoun Hill, as montrose has shown, LWM took the Harrington error and used it to do much the same. Calhoun Hill was pretty much surrounded before they knew it and the warriors recognised when Calhoun realigned and presented a flank to Henryville. While this is not sophisticated stuff it is also not just a swarm. It may just be common sense but in the end that is the basis of tactics. Cheers
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dave
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Post by dave on Aug 10, 2015 22:43:00 GMT
Holly crotch crickets, Batman, are you an entomologist? Regards, Tom I are if being an entomologist is an expert at getting tangled with the red critters. Regards Dave
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mac
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Post by mac on Aug 11, 2015 0:50:19 GMT
As a contrast to LBH I might point to Wolf Mountain where Miles had his forces set up for mutual support and was able to see off the warriors attempts to attack his flanks. Contrast to Custer's dispositions. Cheers
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Post by Beth on Aug 11, 2015 4:25:59 GMT
At Rosebud at least Crook had a location to oversee the battle. Custer might have been able to command from the bluffs but it just wasn't in his nature.
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